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Los Angeles Metropatterns
An overview

G

r o w i n g s o c i a l s e pa rat i o n

and wasteful sprawl threaten the
future of Los Angeles and all other
U.S. metropolitan areas. Social
need is concentrated and deepening in central cities, older suburbs,
and many outlying communities, isolating
those who live there from opportunity. Fastdeveloping cities on the urban fringe are struggling to provide expensive schools, roads, sewer systems, and other basic infrastructure for
their burgeoning populations without adequate local resources. Open
space and rural landscapes are being lost to rapid development while
roadways reach unprecedented levels of gridlock, especially in the
vicinities of growing suburban job centers. Meanwhile, these growth
patterns are placing unnecessary strain on the local environment,
resulting in pollution of the air and water and over-consumption of
limited water supplies.
Los Angeles Metropatterns reports on social, economic, and develop2
ment trends in the Los Angeles region and outlines policy strategies for
reform. Its purposes are: 1) to document social separation and sprawl in
the Los Angeles region; 2) to identify specific effects on jurisdictions in
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the Los Angeles region; and 3) to introduce
policy strategies that might be used to
address the local and regional impacts of
social separation and sprawl. It is MARC’s
hope that the results of this study will help to
further the processes of reform in the Los
Angeles region.
With its huge population and land area,
tremendous immigration and diversity, and its multi-centered pattern
of development, Los Angeles is in many ways unique. However, much
of the evidence of social separation and sprawl follows patterns that
MARC has seen in its studies of other U.S. metropolitan areas. (In fact,
the patterns are more intense and detrimental in Los Angeles than in
many other parts of the country.) These patterns are illustrated in this
report through the use of color-coded maps generated by geographic
information system (GIS) software.3
The report concludes with a brief discussion of policy strategies for
regional reform aimed at reducing social separation and wasteful landuse patterns. Among these recommended reforms is a regional tax-sharing proposal (in many ways similar to California’s existing school equity
system), which is discussed in greater detail in Appendix A.
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From the Core
to the Fringe
The Patterns of Social Separation
and Sprawl

I

t is becoming increasingly apparent that the fiscal, social,
and environmental stresses associated with typical urban development patterns are negatively affecting all metropolitan localities
and their residents. Among the many effects are concentrated
poverty and its attendant racial segregation, inadequate public
infrastructure, over-crowded and under-funded schools, lost open
space, environmental degradation, and unnecessarily high development
fees. The following section describes how different types of metropolitan
communities—from those in the core of a metropolitan area to those on its
fringes—are affected by the prevailing patterns of social separation and
sprawling development.

ISOLATED INNER-CITY NEIGHBORHOODS

As metropolitan development moves outward, it leaves behind at the
core racially segregated, economically depressed neighborhoods. These
high-need neighborhoods are both a cause and a result of the complex
processes of social separation and sprawling development. The intense
needs and social problems related specifically to concentrated poverty
cause people to move outward from the core if they can afford to do so.
As a result of this outward movement, these already depressed neigh-
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borhoods and their residents (increasingly those without residential
choices) grow continually more separated from the rest of the metropolitan region.
As poverty concentrates and inner-city needs and problems intensify,
these communities become less desirable as places to live and work.
Meanwhile, communities without deep poverty develop in other areas of
the region—often at the edges. As a result, households are both “pushed”
out of inner-city neighborhoods and “pulled” into newer communities at
the edges of the region. They are pushed by problems associated with
increasingly poor schools, relatively weak property values, fear of
increasing crime, and inadequate public spending on basic services.
At the same time, they are pulled by schools with fewer poor students,
new homes, and—at least initially—more open space.
Ultimately, these disparities contribute to the isolation of inner-city
neighborhoods from the educational, employment, and social opportunities available to residents in other parts of the region. This lack of opportunity can remain with the neighborhood for many years, passing from
one generation to the next. Even when individuals are able to overcome
these limitations, the neighborhoods they grew up in continue to grow
poorer because these successful individuals often choose to move away.

Sprawling development patterns have negative
consequences for central-city neighborhoods as well as
for developing communities on the metropolitan fringe.

Such persistent poverty makes it extremely difficult to ever connect these
residents and their neighborhoods back into the metropolitan economy—
even in strong economic times.
OLDER COMMUNITIES IN DECLINE

The same patterns of metropolitan growth that lead to poor and isolated
central city neighborhoods also create significant fiscal and social stresses
in older communities beyond the borders of the region’s central city.
Generally, these communities are of two types: established suburbs just
outside of the central city and older satellite cities that are drawn increasingly into the orbit of the metropolitan region as it expands outward.
While the social problems are generally not as severe in these cities as in
the poorest central-city neighborhoods, they exhibit signs of growing
instability and are at the greatest risk of experiencing rapid social decline.
Increasing concentrations of poverty in schools and neighborhoods, decreasing or stagnant home values, the loss of local businesses and jobs,
and the erosion of the local tax base are symptoms of this decline.
Young families with children are often the first to avoid or move away
from encroaching social problems. In most cases, the flight of these families begins as regional development patterns cause poverty to increase in
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local schools. As parents see increasing poverty in a community’s schools,
their perception of the community declines and they become less likely to
choose that community as a place to live. In a relatively short period,
demand for housing in these communities can drop significantly, followed
by declining home-sale prices and weakening retail markets—all of which
accelerate the transformation of these communities from relatively stable,
middle-class communities to communities in decline.
Further, the housing markets and neighborhoods of these declining
communities can be much more fragile than those in the central cities
they surround. Lacking the many amenities of the central city—such as a
strong commercial and industrial base, unique older neighborhoods that
can gentrify into valuable real estate, a large police force, social welfare agencies, diverse arts and culture—they often do not have the
resources to prevent social decline or
to regenerate once that decline has
occurred. The result is a spiraling
decline in the social and economic
stability of these communities. Over

The housing markets
and neighborhoods of
declining suburbs can
be much more fragile
than in the central
cities they surround.
3

time, these cities are at risk of becoming just as isolated from the regional
economy as the depressed central-city neighborhoods.
FRINGE CITIES IN FISCAL STRESS

For developing communities, the effects of social separation and sprawl
are more fiscal than social. These fiscal effects, however, are intimately
related to the social decline of the central city and other communities.
Households with the financial ability to choose where they want to live are
unlikely to choose declining areas in the core of the region. Rather, they
often seek housing in less-developed communities—usually at the edge of
the region. A primary attraction of these less-developed communities is
the presence of schools with comparatively little poverty. Faced with this
growing demand, developing localities often struggle to provide the necessary but expensive public infrastructure, such as roads, sewer systems,
and school buildings.
The fact that many of these growing communities are primarily residential in nature tends to worsen the fiscal stress that they face. It is a general
rule of suburban fiscal planning that a tax base comprised solely or largely
of residential property is insufficient in itself to pay for the infrastructure
needed by a city or school district. Thus, many of these communities struggle to provide expensive infrastructure on an inadequate tax base.
Further, in an effort to increase tax revenues, developing localities compete
with other cities in the region for commercial and/or industrial properties that
can generate higher sales and property tax revenues. Incentives used in this
competition generally take the form of taxpayer-funded subsidies, tax incentives,
abatements, or complicated redevelopment
financing packages that are used to “bribe” businesses to locate within the community’s borders.
Often, these businesses have already decided to
locate somewhere in the region and are simply
looking for the best deal that a city will give them.
In other cases, the tax incentives and subsidies
have little effect on the business location decision
and represent unnecessary use of limited public
funds—funds that could be used to reduce taxes
or improve police and fire protection, libraries,
parks, and other city-provided services.

Many growing
fringe communities
struggle to
provide expensive
infrastructure
on an inadequate
tax base.
4

CONGESTED EMPLOYMENT CENTERS

As employment centers expand outward from the traditional central business district to other areas of the region, traffic congestion and the loss of
open spaces increase significantly. Generally, these outlying concentrations
of commercial and retail businesses are located in relatively affluent communities, where purchasing power is high and expensive homes are available for company executives. In an effort to preserve the many advantages
of their affluence, these cities often zone their land in such a way as to prevent the construction of a broader range of housing choices that would
allow greater socioeconomic diversity.
Despite their strong position relative to other communities in the
region, these cities also face problems in preserving and maintaining the
amenities that made them so desirable in the first place. As Joel Garreau
suggests in his book Edge Cities, these places soon become as “urban” as
the communities that their residents were attempting to avoid. Because of
the concentration of retail and offices in the area, local roadways become
extremely congested with employees and shoppers. Also, as property in
these cities attracts even more executive homes or office and retail buildings, open spaces are threatened and soon lost. Because of the affluence
and relative power of the citizenry who live in them, these are often the first
communities to actively fight urban sprawl—passing local laws that limit
development and/or purchasing open spaces in the area for public parks.
On a regional level, exclusive zoning and unilateral development limits
can contribute greatly to social separation and sprawling development. A
mismatch between where people work and where they live emerges, with
employees commuting both into and out of the area. The result of this
mismatch is significant roadway congestion throughout the region, which
increases the time wasted in traffic jams and reduces the quality of life.
Further, the congestion near these employment centers often means that
the majority of the region’s highway spending is used to expand the commuting corridors serving these centers—which, ironically, often results in
even more development and traffic congestion. Unilateral attempts in
these places to slow the pace of this development through local moratoriums may make the local citizens feel as if they are doing something to
fight sprawl. In reality however, these local actions only serve to throw
development farther out into the fringes of the region, eventually making
the problems worse.
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Social Separation and Sprawl
in the Los Angeles Region

T

he Los Angeles region is the second most populous

metropolitan area in the country. In 1998, the entire metropolitan area contained nearly 15.2 million people, as well as 177
cities, 209 school districts, and an urbanized area that encompasses more than 3,000 square miles—larger than Delaware and
Rhode Island combined. Since 1990, the region has absorbed over
1.2 million people—more than any other metropolitan area in the country.
In some ways, the development patterns that contributed to these conditions in the Los Angeles region are unlike many older regions of the
country. While Midwestern and northeastern
cities tended to develop
radially along streetcar
corridors, Los Angeles’s
development patterns
were based more on the
automobile and freeway.4
And while most metropolitan areas are defined
by their central city, the
Los Angeles region is
more accurately
described as having multiple centers. In The
Reluctant Metropolis,
William Fulton has written of the reluctance of
people in the region to

associate themselves with the City of Los Angeles, choosing instead to
identify with places such as Orange County, the San Fernando Valley, or
San Bernardino.
Despite all of these differences in the physical patterns of development in the Los Angeles region, the impacts on the social landscape are
not much different from those seen in other metropolitan areas of the
country. In some ways, they are much worse. Severe poverty and racial
segregation is concentrated in neighborhoods and schools at the core of
the region and in outlying satellite cities. Significant fiscal disparities exist
among the region’s cities, school districts, and counties. Traffic congestion in the region is worse than in any other metropolitan area.5
Competition among cities for sales tax revenue wastes millions of valuable tax dollars and encourages sprawl. Growing communities at the
edges of the region are struggling with overcrowded schools and inadequate infrastructure—a situation made even worse the in Los Angeles
region because of California’s property tax system (see page 19).
As social separation and sprawl continue to fragment the Los Angeles
region along lines of class and race and spread urban development into the
surrounding landscape, it is important to look broadly at the social, economic, and environmental effects of these patterns. More specifically, it is
important to know how the benefits and costs of current policies and
trends are distributed throughout the region. For instance, as the Los
Angeles region expands geographically, what effect does this have on older
cities? How do public investments in highways and other development
affect patterns of growth and contribute to urban sprawl? Do local tax policies tend to support separation and sprawl or work to prevent them? These
are some of the questions that this report attempts to address and bring to
the forefront of public policy discussions in the Los Angeles region.

Poverty and racial segregation are concentrated
in neighborhoods and schools at the core of the region.

5

The concentration of poverty in core neighborhoods
of Los Angeles has contributed to devastating social
upheavals such as the 1992 riots.
6

Where the Poor
Get Poorer
Concentrated Poverty at the Core

O

ne of the most devastating consequences of social

separation and sprawl is the emergence of highly
concentrated neighborhoods of poverty at the region’s core.
The profound lack of educational and economic opportunity created by extreme social isolation intensifies flight from
affected neighborhoods and dramatically decreases the
quality of life for those left behind.
Urban scholars classify neighborhoods with more than 40 percent of
residents in poverty as high-poverty tracts or ghettos, barrios, or slums
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(depending on the racial composition of the neighborhood). Between
1970 and 1990, a time of national economic prosperity, the number of
poor persons living in high-poverty neighborhoods in the United States
nearly doubled.
For the residents and children left behind in these increasingly poor
communities—disproportionately those who are Hispanic or black—the
result of these patterns is isolation from the educational and economic
opportunities that will help them succeed later in life. This is because
schools and neighborhoods represent a series of reinforcing social net7
works that contribute to success or failure. Neighborhoods and schools
that are not overwhelmed with the social challenges of highly concentrated poverty become streams flowing in the direction of success, moved forward by currents that value hard work, goal-setting, and academic
8
achievement. By contrast, in places where the concentration of poverty
intensifies social and economic problems become streams moving toward
failure, with currents that reinforce anti-social behavior, drifting, teenage
9
pregnancy, and dropping out of school.
Outside of Appalachia, there are few densely poor white neighborhoods
in America. In a typical metro area in 1990, only about 26 percent of poor
10
whites lived in poor neighborhoods. However, 54 percent of poor Hispanic
persons and 75 percent of black persons lived in poor neighborhoods. As
David Rusk has written, “For the great majority of poor whites...poverty is an
individual household condition. Most poor whites are not surrounded by
other poor people. For most poor blacks, and, to a lesser degree, for poor
Hispanics, poverty is a communal crisis, as well as an individual hardship.”11
Racial discrimination in the housing market is a fundamental ingredient in the creation of neighborhoods of concentrated poverty. Various
studies have shown that housing discrimination on the basis of race takes
place at every point of the renting or home-buying process—from the
time a black or Hispanic calls a real estate agent to the time he or she
applies for a mortgage. According to a summary index created as part of a
national housing discrimination survey, the probability of a black or
Hispanic person experiencing some form of discrimination during a housing or rental search is approximately 50 percent.12

Photo credit: Ted Soqui

he effects of concentrated pov-

make education, job searches, and general cent white, while the other participants moved
erty on people who live in such interaction with mainstream society difficult.18
to neighborhoods that were poor and more
The effects of concentrated poverty can be than 90 percent black. The pool of Gautreaux
neighborhoods can be extremely
debilitating. Stimulated by William seen by comparing the experience of the poor families thus provides a strong sample to study
Julius Wilson’s book The Truly living in concentrated poverty to that of poor the effects of suburban housing opportunities
Disadvantaged, scholars in the late individuals living in mixed-income communi- on very poor city residents.
1980s began actively studying the ties. At least one large social experiment
James Rosenbaum and colleagues from
effects of concentrated poverty in metropolitan demonstrates that when poor individuals are Northwestern University have intensively studareas. Their research confirms that concentrated freed from poor neighborhoods and provided ied the Gautreaux families.20 Their research has
poverty multiplies the severity of problems faced with opportunities, their lives can change quite established that the low-income women who
moved to the suburbs “clearly experiby both communities and poor indi13
enced improved employment and
viduals. As neighborhoods become
Percent of Metropolitan Poor Living in
dominated by joblessness, racial segearnings, even though the program
High Poverty Neighborhoods, by Race: 1970-1990
regation, and single-parentage, they
provided no job training or placement
40%
become isolated from middle-class
services .” 21 Very rapidly after the
14
moves, the suburbanites were about 13
society and the private economy.
30%
Individuals, particularly children, are
percent more likely to be employed.22
Rosenbaum also found that the childeprived of local successful role mod20%
dren of the suburban movers dropped
els and connections to opportunity
out of high school less frequently than
outside the neighborhood. The fear of
10%
the city movers (5 percent vs. 20 percrime and violence becomes part of
0%
cent) and maintained similar grades
everyday life. Further, concentrated
1970
1980
1990
despite higher standards in suburban
poverty among adults and children
schools. They also were significantly
has been associated with poor health
White
Black
Hispanic
more likely to be on a college track (40.3
and a higher incidence of disease.15
Source: Poverty and Place: Ghettos, Barrios and the American City, Paul A. Jargowsky
Other studies have found that
percent vs. 23.5 percent ) and to actualpoor individuals living in concentratly attend college (54 percent vs. 21 pered poverty are far more likely to become preg- dramatically. Under a 1976 court order in the cent). In terms of employment, 75 percent of
nant as teenagers, drop out of high school, and fair-housing lawsuit of Hills v. Gautreaux,19 the suburban youth had jobs compared to 41
remain jobless than poor people living in more thousands of single-parent black families living percent in the city. Moreover, the suburban
socially mixed neighborhoods.16 Similarly, the in Chicago public housing have been provided youth had a significant advantage in job pay
concentration of poverty and its attendant housing opportunities in predominantly white and were more likely to have a prestigious job
social isolation leads to the development of middle-class suburbs. By random assignment with benefits. Overall, 90 percent of the suburspeech patterns increasingly distinct from more than half of these households moved to ban youth were either working or in school,
mainstream English.17 These speech differences affluent suburbs that were more than 96 per- compared with 74 percent of the city youth.23
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Concentrated Poverty
Percentage Persons in Poverty by Census Tract, 1980
Percentage Persons
in Poverty

Regional Value: 11.8 %

Data Source:

1980 U.S. Census of
Population and Housing
Summary Tape File 3A
Note:

Census tracts with
“No data” either had
suppression of data on
total persons in poverty
or else had fewer than 50
total persons for whom
poverty status was
determined in 1980.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).

Data from the 1980 census shows that the majority of neighborhoods where more than 20 percent of the
people lived in poverty were concentrated in Los Angeles
and the older cities to its east, such as Bell, Bell Gardens,
Cudahy, Huntington Park, Compton, and Inglewood.
High-poverty tracts (those where the poverty rate exceeded 40 percent) were centered mostly in small pockets of
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eastern and south-central Los Angeles. Outside of the
immediate Los Angeles area, pockets of poor neighborhoods were found primarily in older satellite cities,
including San Bernardino, Long Beach, Ontario, and
Montclair. Overall, 40 percent of all people living in poverty in the Los Angeles region lived in neighborhoods with a
poverty rate of at least 20 percent.

Poverty Deepens and Expands in the Heart of the Region
Percentage Persons in Poverty by Census Tract, 1990
Percentage Persons
in Poverty

Regional Value: 13.1%

Data Source:

1990 U.S. Census of
Population and Housing
Summary Tape File 3A
Note:

Census tracts with “No
data” had fewer than
50 total persons for
whom poverty status
was determined in 1990.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).

During the 1980s, the number of people living in
poverty throughout the Los Angeles region increased by
more than 350,000 people—an increase of nearly 42 percent. A disproportionate amount of this increase (65 percent) was concentrated in many of the same neighborhoods that were burdened with high poverty in 1980.
Overall, the percentage of the region’s poor living in neighborhoods with a poverty rate of at least 20 percent grew

from 40 to 48 percent—evidence that poverty became even
more concentrated during the 1980s. The number of tracts
with a poverty rate of at least 40 percent grew significantly as
well, spreading outward into surrounding neighborhoods.
More recent data of elementary school poverty suggest that
the expansion of high-poverty neighborhoods in the core of
the region has continued throughout the 1990s, despite
strong economic growth in the latter half of the decade.

9

Cities In Decline
Disinvestment and Middle-Class Flight

T

he social decline seen in inner-city neighborhoods is most

likely to spread to communities where the middle-class chooses
not to live. When middle-class presence declines, there is a growing risk that these places and their residents will be isolated from
the growth and investment occurring elsewhere in the region.
Growing poverty in local schools represents a powerful negative prophecy for cities. In the Los Angeles region there has been tremendous
growth in student poverty in stressed core communities, such as Bellflower,
Anaheim, and Whittier. Generally, families with choices will seek the least
poor school district in which they can afford to live. As demand for middleclass housing begins to lag, housing prices fall behind areas with low poverty
in their schools. This accelerates the decline, since individuals and businesses with choices available to them tend to look for places with the strongest
appreciation in prices. Because of discrimination in the housing market,
schools in the declining communities often see a rise in the number of
minority students as the rate of student poverty increases.
While an increasing concentration of poverty is a sign of growing stress
for a community, high crime rates often signal that a community has

already experienced significant social decline. This can be seen in the
Los Angeles region, where the highest rates of crime tend to be found in the
poorest and most economically depressed communities—both at the core
of the region and in older satellite cities. These places are also among those
with the most limited resources to provide adequate police protection.
When a community experiences high or increasing rates of crime, middleclass families are likely to move away to other communities—just as they
tend to do when poverty increases in their local schools. This flight further
reduces the resources and stability required to address the increased crime
and effectively reduce it.

As growing poverty in
local schools pushes
families away from
older communities,
their housing
values decline.
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here is a broadly shared illusion

that the civil rights movement of
the 1960s solved the problem of racial
segregation in this country. However,
residential patterns remain highly
segregated for blacks and Hispanics.
Further, recent evidence indicates that
segregation is actually increasing in U.S. schools,
particularly for black and Hispanic students.
The tables below show that by 1996, Hispanic
students attended schools that were poorer and
less white than schools attended by any other
racial group. Black students were similarly
segregated in terms of both race and poverty.
Asian students, by contrast, attended schools
that were much less segregated than their
Hispanic and black counterparts.

Segregation is increasing in schools
attended by Hispanic children.

White
Student

Black
Student

Hispanic
Student

Asian
Student

Native
American
Student

% White

81.2

32.6

29.9

46.9

49.2

% Black

8.6

54.5

11.8

12.1

6.7

Rights and NCES Common Core of Data Public School
Universe. Tables from Gary Orfield and John T. Yun,
“Resegregation in American Schools,” (The Civil Rights
Project: Harvard University, 1999).

% Hispanic

6.6

9.8

52.5

18.5

9.1

% Asian

2.8

2.7

5.0

21.8

2.3

Note: Percent poor signifies the proportion of students

% Native American

0.8

0.4

0.8

0.7

32.7

18.7

42.7

46.0

29.3

30.9

Racial Composition and Poverty Status of Schools
Attended by Average Student,
by Race 1996-1997

Source: U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil

receiving free or reduced price lunches because of low
family income.

% Poor (of any race)
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Poverty in Schools
Percentage of Elementary Students Eligible for Free and Reduced-cost Meals by School District, 1996
Percentage Eligible

Regional Value: 60.6%

Data Source:

Free and reduced-cost
meals data and total
enrollment figures
provided by the
California Department
of Education.
Note:

School districts with
“No data” had fewer
than 50 elementary
students in 1996.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).

Of the nearly 1.5 million elementary
students in the 165 school districts of the Los
Angeles region in 1996, 61 percent of students were eligible for free or reduced-cost
meals. This represents a far greater percentage than is found in California as a whole
(about 47 percent of California students are
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eligible for free or reduced-cost lunches).
In 1996, 83 percent of the elementary school
students in the Los Angeles Unified School
District qualified for reduced-cost meals. High
rates of student poverty were also found in the
older communities of southeast Los Angeles
County, including the Compton (88 percent),

Montebello (79 percent), and Long Beach (76
percent) school districts. Other districts with
poverty rates above 75 percent could be found
in the San Gabriel Valley and near San
Bernardino, Palm Springs, and Adelanto.

An Increase in Poor Students Can Signal Decline
Change in Percentage of Elementary Students Eligible for Free and Reduced-cost Meals by School District, 1988-1996
Change in % Points

Regional Value: +16.3

Data Source:

Free and reduced-cost
meals data and total
enrollment figures
provided by the
California Department
of Education.
Note:

School districts with
“No data” did not
have data available
for 1988.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).

Nearly all of the school districts that saw
the fastest increase in elementary school student poverty between 1988 and 1996 were
located in the older core communities east of
Los Angeles or in low tax-capacity areas of San
Bernardino and Riverside Counties. For many

of these districts, such as Hawthorne (32 to 86
percent), Anaheim (19 to 79), and Buena Park
(29 to 61), student poverty in 1988 was already
higher than the regional average, signifying an
increasing concentration of poverty in the
region. For somewhat less distressed districts,

such as Orange (21 to 43), Downey (21 to 53),
and Apple Valley (30 to 57), the recent increases
in student poverty may signal the beginning
stages of increasing social stress and the downward spiral of flight and disinvestment.
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Racial Segregation in Schools
Percentage of Hispanic and Black Elementary Students by School District, 1996*
% Hispanic and Black

Regional Value: 61.0%

Data Source:

Racial data and total
enrollment figures
provided by the
California Department
of Education.
Note:

School districts marked
“No data” had fewer
than 50 elementary
students in 1996.

*

Asian and Native
American students
are not included in this
analysis because they
tend to experience
less educational and
housing segregation
than do Hispanic and
black students
(see p. 11).
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).

Segregation in the housing market
is placing Hispanic and black students of the
Los Angeles region in densely poor schools with
severely limited educational opportunities.
While blacks have long lived in highly segregated conditions in California, the segregation of
Hispanics has increased significantly in recent
years. In 1970, Hispanic children attended
California schools with an average of 54 per-
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cent white enrollment. But by 1996, they were
in schools where the average white enrollment
24
had plummeted to under 24 percent.
Overall, 61 percent of elementary students
in the Los Angeles region in 1996 were
Hispanic or black. School districts with especially high rates of Hispanic and black students
were almost exclusively located in economically depressed communities located just to the

south and east of Los Angeles. These included
Compton (99 percent), Inglewood (98 percent),
Lennox (97 percent), and Montebello (93 percent). Districts with extremely low rates of
Hispanic and black students were found in
more affluent districts of the region, including
Las Virgenes (7 percent), Beverly Hills (6 percent), Palos Verdes Peninsula (5 percent), and
La Canada (3 percent).

Black and Hispanic Students are Increasingly Isolated
Change in Percentage of Hispanic and Black Elementary Students by School District, 1986-1996*
Change in % Points

Regional Value: +9.2

Data Source:

Racial data and total
enrollment figures
provided by the
California Department
of Education.
Note:

Districts marked
“No Data” had fewer
than 50 elementary
students in 1986
or 1996.

*

Asian and Native
American students
are not included in this
analysis because they
tend to experience
less educational and
housing segregation
than do Hispanic and
black students
(see p. 11).
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).

As a whole , the percentage of Hispanic and
black elementary students in the Los Angeles
region increased from 52 to 61 percent between
1986 and 1996. Over one-third of the growth in
Hispanic and black elementary students
throughout the region occurred in just 33 of the
region’s 165 school districts—most of which were

located in the core of the region and all of which
had above average student poverty in 1986. This
suggests an increasing concentration of Hispanic
and black elementary students in poor schools.
Especially large increases could be found in
the core districts of Downey (33 to 68 percent)
and Bellflower (24 to 55 percent). Significant

increases also occurred in the increasingly poor
outlying districts of Mountain View (27 to 58
percent) and Fontana (41 to 77 percent) in San
Bernardino County, Moreno Valley (28 to 59
percent) in Riverside County, and Palmdale (21
to 54 percent) and Eastside Union (17 to 50 percent) in northern Los Angeles County.
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Crime Rates
Part I Crimes per 100,000 Population by Police Jurisdiction, 1996
Crimes per
100,000 Persons

Regional Value: 5,120.2

Data Source:

California State
Department of Justice,
California and FBI Crime
Indexes, 1996
Note:

Part I crimes as
defined by the FBI
include murder, rape,
robbery, aggravated
assault, burglary, theft,
auto theft, and arson.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).

Overall, Part I crimes (which include both
property and violent crimes) in the region were
measured at 5,120 crimes per 100,000 persons in
1996. Higher than average Part I crime rates
could generally be found in Los Angeles and in
cities south and east of the city. A substantial
number of cities in San Bernardino and Riverside
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counties also had relatively high crime rates.
Many of these high-crime cities have a relatively low tax base from which to provide adequate police services; these include Bellflower
(6,376 crimes per 100,000 persons), Ontario
(6,348), and Redlands (5,522). The communities with the lowest crime rates were concen-

trated in relatively affluent areas—including
the San Fernando Valley and Simi Hills area,
southern Orange County, and the Palos Verdes
area. These cities include Thousand Oaks
(2,345 crimes per 100,000 persons), Mission
Viejo (2,230), and Palos Verdes Estates (1,352).

High Crime Rates Can Be a Sign of Community Decline
Percentage Change in Part I Crimes per Capita by Police Jurisdiction, 1986-1996
Percentage Change

Regional Value: -28.0%

Data Source:

California State
Department of
Justice, California
and FBI Crime
Indexes, 1986 and
1996
Note:

Part I crimes as
defined by the FBI
include murder, rape,
robbery, aggravated
assault, burglary,
theft, auto theft, and
arson.
Note:

Jurisdictions with
“No data” did not
exist in 1986.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).

Between 1986 and 1996, the per capita
Part I crime rate for the entire Los Angeles
region declined by 28 percent—from 7,111 to
5,120 crimes per 100,000 residents. This mirrors
a national pattern correlated to dramatic
employment growth. The small number of
cities that actually saw increases in their crime
rates tended to be cities with low tax bases con-

centrated southeast of Los Angeles. These
included the communities of Bellflower (rising
from 5,407 to 6,376 Part I crimes per 100,000
residents), Norwalk (4,325 to 4,436), and
Lakewood (4,937 to 4,988).
On the positive side, a number of relatively
poor communities, such as Santa Ana (8,746 to
4,433), Orange (6,462 to 3,435), and Garden

Grove (7,208 to 4,296) saw significant declines
in their crime rates. Still, a clear pattern
emerges, where cities with the most significant
rates in crime are centered in the poorest and
most economically depressed areas while more
affluent areas enjoy relatively low crime rates.
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Growing Pains
Struggling to Maintain an Adequate Local Tax Base

M

any of the cities in the Los Angeles region faced with

large and growing spending needs also have a comparatively small tax base from which to generate revenue.
Given California’s limitations on property tax rates (see
facing page), these cities are forced to look for additional
sources of revenue, such as development fees. In many
cases, however, these alternative sources of revenue are so limited that
cities are forced to reduce or eliminate basic public services.25
In the Los Angeles region, as with other regions throughout the country, cities with low property and sales tax bases also tend to be burdened
with a disproportionate number of factors that make providing public
services especially costly—poor school-age children, high crime rates, or
significant population growth and rapidly increasing school enrollments.
More affluent areas with high tax bases, on the other hand, tend to not be

burdened by these factors and are thus better able to provide quality
public services without having to search for alternative sources of revenue. When a school district experiences significant growth in its student enrollment over a relatively short period of time, its costs of adequately serving those students tend to increase. These costs generally
relate to new infrastructure needs, such as building schools. Spending
on these infrastructure needs can limit the amount of money that is
available for other education-related needs, such as teachers, books, or
other resources.
Significant population growth in a city over a short time period also
increases the costs of infrastructure and other public services—especially
if the growth was not expected and planned for ahead of time. Many of
these costs relate to the initial construction costs associated with new
roads, sewer lines, parks, and other infrastructure. When these costs rise, it
prevents a city or county from spending that money on other valuable
public services.

Percent change in population, by county: 1986-1996

50 %
Ventura County

43 %

40 %

San Bernadino
County

30 %

Riverside County

20 %

Orange County

10 %

33 %

10 %
Los Angeles County

0%

10 %

6%
Source: Population Estimates Program, Population Division,
U.S. Census Bureau
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With rapid population
growth comes major
infrastructure needs–
expenses that many
growing communities
can ill afford.

efore 1978, local governments

in California were able to tax
property within their borders at
whatever rate was necessary to
provide desired services. Cities,
counties, school districts, and
other taxing entities could
decide each year how much revenue they
would need to provide the services that their
residents desired, and set their tax rates
accordingly. But in the late 1970s, rapidly escalating property values (without commensurate
reductions in tax rates) led to a property tax
revolt that precipitated state action.
With the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978,
control over property tax rates and revenues
was shifted to the state—significantly reducing the amount of property tax revenues available to local governments as well as their flexibility in providing varying levels of public
services. Statewide, the passage of Proposition
13 resulted in a decrease of $6.8 billion in local
property tax revenues (57 percent) between
1975-76 and 1993-94.26 Major changes that
occurred as a result of Proposition 13 include:
Changes in Assessment
Procedures—

The value of property for taxing purposes shifted from an estimate of “fair market value” to
the actual “acquisition value.” In other words, a
property’s value for tax purposes is equal to the
price paid for it at the time of sale. Until the
property is re-sold, the assessed value of the
property is allowed to rise no more than two

percent each year. When the property is sold
again, the assessed value becomes the new
sale price.
L i m i tat i o n s o n t h e
P r o p e r t y Ta x R at e —

Proposition 13 limited the property tax rate to no
more than 1 percent of assessed value (exceptions are allowed for the payment of voterapproved general obligation
debt or pre-1978 government
employee retirement plans.)
Prior to 1978, local property
tax rates in California averaged about 2.7 percent—
nearly three times that allowed after Proposition 13.
A l l o c at i o n o f
P r o p e r t y Ta x R e v e n u e s —

erty tax revenues and local flexibility in providing services has been profound. Without the
ability to set their own tax rates, local units of
government are constrained in their ability to
respond to the desires of their citizens for public services or the need for redevelopment.
Further, dependence on alternative sources of
revenue has increased. These sources often
include development fees (such as charges for
the cost of extending
sewers) that increase the
cost of new housing, or
the sales tax, which is
often the object of wasteful competition among
cities (see page 27).
All of these effects of
Proposition 13 tend to
disadvantage low-income,
developed communities
already experiencing social decline. With the
state-mandated limitations on tax rates and little ability to generate revenue from other sources,
these localities face significant burdens in trying to reverse the cycle
of decline. Most simply fall further behind the
other cities, counties, and school districts in
the region. Thus, while the overall effect of
Proposition 13 and other tax limitations continues to be debated, it has more likely contributed to social separation than helped to
alleviate it.

The passage of
Proposition 13
resulted in a
57 percent
decrease in
local property
tax revenue.

Revenues collected on property in a county are distributed back to the local units of
government within that
county by a state-determined
formula. This formula effectively locks in the relative distribution of property tax revenues that
existed in 1978, just before Proposition 13
was passed. Statewide, cities receive an average of only 11 percent of total property tax
revenues. Counties receive about 19 percent,
school districts 52 percent, and other local
entities 18 percent.
The impact of Proposition 13 on local prop-
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Revenue Factor: Property Tax Base
Assessed Property Value per Household by Municipality and County Unincorporated Area, 1996
Property Value per Household

Regional Value: $168,382

Data Source:

California State Controller’s
Office; Los Angeles County
Auditor-Controller; Orange
County Auditor-Controller;
Riverside County Assessor;
San Bernardino County
Auditor/Controller-Recorder;
Ventura County Assessor
(tax base data); California
Department of Finance,
Demographic Research Unit
(1996 household
estimates)
Note:

Municipalities with
“No data” had fewer than
50 households in 1996.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area Research
Corporation (MARC).

The lowest property values (and thus,
the lowest property tax base) per household in
1996 could be found almost entirely in outlying
areas of San Bernardino and Riverside counties
and in the core cities of southeast Los Angeles
County, where property is primarily residential in
nature and social stress is increasing. By contrast,
above-average property values could be found
mostly in the growing, affluent communities of
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southern Orange County and Ventura County.
Overall, assessed property values in the Los
Angeles region were measured at $168,382 per
household in 1996. Two-thirds of the region’s
households live in communities where property values are below average. Especially low
property tax bases per household were found in
outlying satellite communities such as San
Bernardino ($61,924), Barstow ($65,526), and

Twentynine Palms ($71,618) in San Bernardino
County. The older, declining core cities of
Inglewood ($98,795), Bellflower ($90,235),
Maywood ($72,135), and Cudahy ($68,685) also
had low property tax bases. Cities with property tax bases per household that were well above
average included Laguna Hills ($681,456),
Irvine ($340,486), Arcadia ($234,492), and
Moorpark ($230,177).

Revenue Factor: Sales Tax Base
Taxable Sales Transactions per Household by Municipality and County Unincorporated Area, 1996
Transactions per
Household

Regional Value: $28,505

Localities with the lowest taxable
sales transactions per household in 1996 were
spread throughout the region. In some of these
communities, a significant property tax base
compensates for the low sales tax base. There
are however, a number of cities—particularly
stressed core communities in southeast Los
Angeles County—that have neither an adequate property nor an adequate sales tax base.

In 1996, taxable transactions in the Los
Angeles region were measured at $28,505 per
household. Stressed core cities with low sales
tax bases included Inglewood ($17,162),
Temple City ($13,123), San Marino ($8,470),
and Sierra Madre ($3,476). A number of highincome cities with few social stresses, such as
Palos Verdes Estates ($3,802), La Habra Heights
($2,524), and Chino Hills ($6,664), also had low

sales tax bases. However, the high property tax
base in these cities more than makes up for the
lack of a sales tax base.
Places with particularly high sales tax bases
tended to be located in commercial centers of
Orange County, the San Gabriel Valley, and
western Riverside County. These included
Cerritos ($129,040), Beverly Hills ($96,745),
Irvine ($69,245), and El Segundo ($64,701).
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Cost Factor: School Enrollment
Growth in Elementary Student Enrollment by School District, 1988-1996
Percentage Change

Regional Value: 20.7%

Data Source:

Total enrollment figures
provided by the California
Department of Education.
Note:

Districts with “No data”
had fewer than
50 elementary students
in 1988.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area Research
Corporation (MARC).

Overall, the number of students enrolled in
elementary schools across the region increased
by more than 255,000 students between 1988
and 1996—an increase of nearly 21 percent.
About 56 percent of the region’s districts with
elementary students grew at a rate exceeding
the regional average. Most of these were out-
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side of the immediate core area.
Some of the most significant percentage
increases in elementary student populations
took place in the Antelope Valley of northern
Los Angeles County and in Riverside County,
areas where the local tax capacity to fund
school construction is comparatively small.

School districts with particularly high percentage increases over the period included Murietta
Valley (which increased by nearly 350 percent),
Perris (83 percent), and Coachella Valley (42
percent). Districts closer to the core that grew
significantly were Santa Ana (69 percent) and
Anaheim (41 percent).

Cost Factor: Population Growth
Growth in Population by Municipality, 1986-1996
Percentage Change

Regional Value: 18.3 %

Data Source:

California Department of
Finance, Demographic
Research Unit (1986 and
1996 population estimates)
Note:

Municipalities with
“No data” did not exist
in 1986.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).

The population of the Los Angeles region
grew by 16 percent between 1986 and 1996, gaining more than 2.1 million people. The largest percentage increases in population took place in
Riverside and San Bernardino counties, which
grew by 62 and 46 percent, respectively. Overall,
nearly 69 percent of the region’s population

growth took place outside of Los Angeles County.
Most of the fastest growth in the region was
located in communities where the tax base is
relatively low and where expensive infrastructure investments would be needed. The relatively small tax base in these cities makes it difficult to pay for necessary infrastructure with-

out state assistance, burdensome development
fees, or wasteful efforts to attract retail properties and the sales tax revenue they provide.
Among these fast-growing, low tax-capacity
cities were Palmdale (which grew by 317 percent), San Jacinto (124 percent), and Moreno
Valley (101 percent).
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A Web of Worries
Regional Effects of
Social Separation
and Sprawl

T

he previous sections of this report have discussed how social

separation and sprawl affect specific cities and other local jurisdictions in the Los Angeles region. However, there are many
effects that are not so easily assigned to specific local governments or their property owners and residents. In fact, many of
the negative aspects of social separation and sprawl impact the
entire region. Some of these—such as traffic congestion and poor air quality—are readily apparent. Others are not so obvious, such as when local
governments favor land uses that generate high tax revenues over more
beneficial uses. This section describes several factors that contribute to
the more generalized effects that are detrimental to the economy and
quality of life throughout the region.

FISCAL ZONING AND COMPETITION FOR TAX BASE

Land-use decisions and the amount and quality of public services provided by cities and counties are often significantly influenced by the amount
of local tax revenue that is available. This reality forces local jurisdictions
to compete for commercial properties, high-valued homes, and office
parks, and prevent land uses that generate less revenue but require more
city services, such as lower-valued homes or apartments.27 This process is
known as “fiscal zoning.” Because there is only a limited supply of these
“good” land uses, it is inevitable that a small number of cities will win the
competition while the greater majority will lose, leading to significant fis-
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cal disparities. Further, the land uses that generate the most revenue are
not necessarily those that provide the greatest long-term benefit for the
city and its residents, or for the region as a whole.
This competition, as many critics suggest, creates a number of undesirable consequences. First, wealthy jurisdictions with large tax bases have
an advantage over less affluent localities in attracting desired land uses,
since individuals and businesses will typically choose to locate in places
where the population is generally wealthy and quality services are provided. This leads to a concentration of revenue-generating land uses and
their benefits in relatively few localities. Conversely, places with the greatest need for additional revenues to address social and economic problems
are at a disadvantage when competing for revenue-generating property,
which leads to further social separation. Lastly, competition forces localities to abandon long-range planning as they struggle to attract certain
properties before they go elsewhere. This leads to poorly planned, sprawling development that destroys open spaces and causes fiscal stress.
In the Los Angeles region, the clearest motivator of fiscal zoning is the
sales tax. Because of limitations imposed on property tax revenue by
Proposition 13, the sales tax has taken on increased importance to local
officials seeking to increase their overall tax revenues, and has become a
focal point for competition. Efforts by cities to attract large retail developments by offering tax breaks, subsidies, and expensive infrastructure
improvements has resulted in the wasteful use of public funds (see box
on page 27).
JOBS/HOUSING MISMATCH AND TRAFFIC CONGESTION

In many regions, office parks and retail centers outside of the core now
absorb a greater share of employment growth than do the traditional
central-city employment centers. Many of these jobs are relatively lowpaying and low-skilled jobs, especially in the retail businesses that are so
highly sought after by California cities. Since many of the employees
who fill these jobs cannot afford to live in the executive housing that surrounds these employment centers, they must commute from other areas
of the region. For those who are the poorest and most in need of the
jobs, it may be very difficult to find transportation to these employment
centers. In this sense, the decentralization of employment disproportionately affects poor, inner-city residents and further isolates them from

Photo credit: Spencer Grant/PhotoEdit
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employment opportunities.28 This phenomenon is often referred to as a
“spatial mismatch” between jobs and housing.29
To the extent that workers can get to the jobs, this mismatch between
affordable housing and employment opportunities often contributes to
extreme congestion at the peak hours of commuting. Further, as development intensifies in the vicinity of these satellite employment centers, traffic
congestion caused by commuters and shoppers increases very quickly. Thus,
decentralized employment centers can lead not only to the loss of valuable
open space, but also to the loss of time spent on congested freeways.
INEFFECTIVE AND INEQUITABLE HIGHWAY SPENDING

Public investments in a metropolitan transportation network—and where
such investments take place—can have a significant effect on the degree
of social separation and sprawl that a metropolitan region experiences. In
the Los Angeles region, imbalanced investments in the regional transportation network have contributed to the social separation and economic decline of many core communities while benefiting areas such as
southern Orange County and Ventura County. The increasingly isolated
communities at the core of the region bear the costs of transportation
investments but experience little, if any, benefit from the economic development that it promotes.
Spending on new highway construction, lane widening, and other
improvements frequently targets areas where highway congestion is
increasing. This congestion is often caused in part by the fragmented
parochial land use pattern in which developing communities compete for
jobs and expensive housing. However,
because transportation planning typically
focuses only on congestion, without
addressing these other important factors
that cause congestion, major expenditures
often have little effect on the problems they
were designed to counter. According to a
recent study of congestion by the Texas
Transportation Institute, traffic congestion
in the Los Angeles region has steadily worsened between 1982 and 1997—and this
region continues to have the worst overall

Expenditures on
new highway
construction often
have little effect on
the problems they are
intended to counter.
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congestion in the nation.30 Further, a companion study by the Surface
Transportation Policy Project (STPP) suggests that expanding road capacity
does little to reduce congestion in the long term.31 According to the STPP
report, even as the Los Angeles region has expanded the number of freeway
lane-miles in its urbanized areas by 54 percent (1,840 lane-miles), the average peak travel speed on these freeways has dropped by more than 14 percent, from 42 to 36 mph. It suggests that these new freeways fail to reduce
congestion because the expanded capacity encourages more people to
drive. Moreover, these freeway investments, by spurring developments that
exclude the less affluent, can act to further increase the social isolation of
poor communities already falling behind the rest of the region.

Photo credit: Sibylla Allgaier/Heliphoto

he wasteful aspects of intra-

regional competition for sales
tax revenues come to a head in an
area William Fulton refers to as
“Sales Tax Canyon” in his book, The
Reluctant Metropolis. Located on
the Oxnard Plain along Highway 101
in Ventura County, “Sales Tax Canyon” is a
strip of three cities—Oxnard, Ventura, and
Camarillo—whose cumulative efforts to
attract retail businesses within their borders
has wasted valuable public dollars, drained
economic development from less affluent
cities in the region, and created increased
traffic congestion.
The intense competition among these
cities for sales tax revenue was spurred on by
Proposition 13. As Fulton states, “In 1978, the
year before the proposition passed, the three
major cities on the Oxnard Plain collected

about $8 million in property tax and $10 million in sales tax. In 1979, when the Proposition
13 tax limitations kicked in, the three cities
collected almost $12 million in sales tax and
only $3.7 million in property tax. It was obvious that, to survive, the Oxnard Plain
cities…would have to focus on sales tax.” 34
Because of the importance of the sales tax
in generating revenue, Oxnard, Ventura, and
Camarillo have each attempted to entice and
accommodate retail stores in their cities while
at the same time working to prevent their
neighbors from doing the same. These efforts
have resulted in the use of vast amounts of
public dollars for land acquisition, tax breaks,
infrastructure improvements, and even cash
payments. The cities have also filed and
threatened lawsuits against each other to stop
proposed retail development—requiring further use of limited tax dollars. In every case,

LOSS OF OPEN SPACE AND FARMLAND

The loss of open space and agricultural land has become an important
concern in California and the Los Angeles region. The creation of the
California Coastal Commission in the 1970s to control growth and protect
coastal areas was an early example. More recently, local growth-control
initiatives have become major issues at all levels of government—especial32
ly in the fastest growing areas. For instance, citizens of Ventura County,
one of these rapidly growing areas, recently supported growth controls by
voting to prohibit the rezoning of agricultural land in unincorporated
33
areas for the next 20 years without voter approval.
In some communities, attempts are made to reduce the environmental

the competition was intensified by the fear of
lost sales tax revenue. Freed from the need to
compete for these tax revenues, these three
cities could have spent their sales tax revenues
on improving public services and creating a
higher quality of life for their residents.
Instead, residents of these cities face increased
traffic congestion, the loss of agricultural land,
and tax revenues tied up for years in deals
with developers.

Intra-regional competition
for sales tax revenue wastes
public dollars and drains
economic development from
less affluent cities in the region.

and social impacts caused by the loss of agricultural land and open
space—usually in the form of limits on the amount of development that is
allowed or tax referenda that approve the purchase of lands for open
spaces or parks. By themselves however, these communities cannot affect
the conversion of land to urban uses at a regional level. Local limitations
on development ultimately contribute to the loss of land in other areas of
the region that are unable or unwilling to control the pace or intensity of
development. Thus, without a regional land use plan that protects open
space and farmland, the actions of individual jurisdictions to control
growth and preserve land can actually make the problems associated with
sprawl worse rather than better.
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Where the Jobs Are
Employment per 100 Persons by Municipality, 1994
Employment per
100 Persons

Regional Value: 42.4

Data Source:

Southern California
Association of Governments
Note:

Employment data were not
available for cities marked
“No data.”
The Los Angeles area
experienced an economic
recession during the
period 1990-94. 1994 jobs
data were the most recent
available data.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area Research
Corporation (MARC).

In 1994, the strongest employment centers
outside of downtown Los Angeles could be
found in areas that are relatively affluent, and
thus less accessible to lower income people
who reside primarily in the core of the region.
These include Irvine (121 jobs per 100 resi-

28

dents) and Newport Beach (102) in Orange
County and Thousand Oaks (62) and San Buenaventura (60) in Ventura County.
The lowest per capita employment in the
region was in communities of southern Los
Angeles County such as Maywood (13 jobs per

100 residents) and Lynwood (18) and in cities
surrounding San Bernardino such as Highland
(11) and Yucaipa (18). Residents of these cities
are among those most in need of low-skill, livable-wage jobs, yet they are far from the
employment centers that provide them.

Employment Opportunities Dwindle in the Core
Percentage Change in Employment per Capita by Municipality, 1990-1994
% Change
in Employment

Regional Value: -12.3%

Data Source:

Southern California
Association of
Governments
Note:

Employment data were not
available for cities marked
“No data.”
The Los Angeles area
experienced an economic
recession during the
period 1990-94. 1994 jobs
data were the most recent
available data.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).

Despite the traditional concentration of jobs
in Los Angeles, per-capita employment there
actually decreased by nearly 15 percent between
1990 and 1994. In fact, more than 80 percent of
the cities in the Los Angeles region saw their per
capita employment decline over the period, at
least partly due to the effects of a national recession. However, the employment growth experienced in other cities of the region suggests that

the strongest employment centers are located in
areas far outside of the core of the region.
Cities with the greatest declines in employment were again located in cities south and
east of Los Angeles, such as Bellflower (39 to 22
jobs per 100 persons), Seal Beach (49 to 30), and
Long Beach (55 to 40). A few cities in San
Bernardino, Riverside, and Ventura counties
also experienced significant declines, including

Banning (39 to 29), Fontana (38 to 29), and
Moorpark (33 to 23). Only a few places saw any
sort of significant growth in employment per
100 persons; these included Irvine (108 to 121),
Thousand Oaks (51 to 62), and Palmdale (23 to
37). These trends suggest that employment
opportunities are dwindling for residents in the
core of the region as job growth occurs disproportionately in other areas of the region.
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Highway Spending
Spending on Highway Improvements, 1988-1996
Projects > $5 Million

(thousands of dollars)

Data Source:

California Department
of Transportation
Note:

“Highway Improvement”
projects defined as new
road construction, road
widenings, bridge removals
and replacements, and
major improvement projects
done on intersections.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area Research
Corporation (MARC).

Between 1988 and 1996, a significant
amount of money was spent expanding freeways, widening bridges, and increasing capacity in areas outside the core of the region. Some
of the largest and most expensive projects took
place along Interstate 5 in Orange County—one
of the most affluent areas in the region. Others
helped to improve access to growing residential
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areas in San Bernardino, Riverside, and northern Los Angeles counties. These improvements,
justified as a response to demand and existing
congestion, do little to reduce congestion in the
long term. In many cases, they encourage people to move to these areas and businesses to
locate along them, meaning that any reductions
in congestion are only temporary. Even the sig-

nificant improvements on highways in the core
of the region—including the Century Freeway
and the Harbor Freeway—have done little to
reduce congestion or to help lower-income
individuals access jobs in the employment centers at the edge.

Urban Sprawl
Change in Urbanized Area, 1970-1990
Legend

Data Source:

1990 U.S. Census Bureau
Tiger Files (1990 map);
1990 CPH-S-1-2 “1990 Census
of Population and Housing
Supplementary Reports
Urbanized Areas of the United
States and Puerto Rico,” dated
12/93 (1990 data); “1970
Census of Population Volume 1,
Characteristics of the
Population, Part A, Number of
Inhabitants, Section 1, United
States, Alabama-Mississippi”
dated 2/72 (1970 maps
and data)
Note:

The Indio-Coachella,
Hesperia-Apple ValleyVictorville, Hemet-San Jacinto,
Lancaster-Palmdale,
Palm Springs, & Simi Valley
urbanized areas did not exist
in 1970.
Prepared by the Metropolitan
Area Research Corporation
(MARC).

According to the Census Bureau’s measurement of urbanized areas, the Los Angeles
region expanded by more than 1,000 square
miles between 1970 and 1990—mostly in areas
around relatively large employment centers.
Much of this growth has taken place in southern Orange County, in the Simi and Antelope
valleys, and in outlying areas of Riverside and

San Bernardino counties.
In 1970, the U.S. Census Bureau designated
three areas in the Los Angeles region as urbanized: Los Angeles-Long Beach, Riverside-San
Bernardino, and Oxnard-Ventura. By 1980, four
additional areas within the five-county region
were designated urbanized: Palm Springs,
Lancaster-Palmdale, Simi Valley, and Hemet-

San Jacinto. Over the next decade, two more
areas were designated as urbanized: HesperiaApple Valley-Victorville in San Bernardino
County and Indio-Coachella in Riverside
County.
Over
the
entire
20-year
period, the amount of land considered urbanized increased significantly, from 1,993 square
miles in 1970 to 3,014 in 1990.
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Putting Things Right
Regional Solutions to Separation and Sprawl

T

he information presented in this report demonstrates the

need for a regional approach to stabilize communities experiencing disinvestment, reduce fiscal disparities, and discourage
sprawling development. As shown in this report, these problems are closely related to tax policies that discourage regional
economic cooperation, public infrastructure investment patterns that support sprawling development, and fragmented governance
and land planning. As a result, all local governments and residents
throughout the Los Angeles region experience some form of social or fiscal
stress and a reduction in the quality of life that they might otherwise enjoy
through a more orderly pattern of development.
MARC and a growing core of scholars, government officials, business
leaders, and environmental and anti-poverty activists believe that the
problems associated with metropolitan social separation and sprawl call
for a strong, multifaceted, regional response. To combat the patterns that
lead to social separation and wasteful sprawl, there are three areas of
reform that must be sought on a regional scale: 1) greater fiscal equity
among jurisdictions of a region, particularly those with land-use planning
powers; 2) smarter growth management through better planning practices; and 3) structural reform of metropolitan governance and trans-
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portation planning. These reforms are inter-related and reinforce each
other both substantively and politically.
GREATER FISCAL EQUITY

Local governments in the Los Angeles region should gradually move away
from funding services through local land-use decisions and toward a form
of regional fiscal equity among units of government with land-use planning powers. Sharing local tax resources helps to create equity, reduce
wasteful competition, and foster cooperation—making regional land-use
planning more possible. It is important to note that in such a system lies
the possibility of both improving services and lowering taxes for the vast
majority of citizens in the region.
Greater fiscal equity between cities with land-use planning powers in
the Los Angeles region can help to reduce disparities and allow communities to create an orderly and efficient regional land-use plan35 by: 1)
easing the fiscal constraints in declining communities and allowing them
to re-invest in their community; 2) taking the pressure off growing communities to spread local debt costs through poorly managed growth and
wasteful subsidies to developers; and 3) reducing fiscal incentives to
compete for land uses that encourage low-density sprawl. This equity
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California’s school equity
system points the way toward
a promising solution to reducing
fiscal disparities among cities in
the Los Angeles region.

Light rail is a key
component of a
successful multi-modal
transportation system.

A tax-base sharing
system would produce
additional tax base for
more than 75% of the
Los Angeles region.
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can be created in a number of ways.
In California, sales tax-base sharing
provides the greatest promise.
Nearly every state and many metropolitan areas in the nation have
already implemented equalization formulas that create greater fiscal equity
among local jurisdictions. A few have
addressed this problem by consolidating city and county governments or
annexing surrounding communities to
the central city, but this is increasingly
rare. The most common forms of fiscal
equalization are school equity systems
that reduce the dependence of schools
on locally generated revenue (usually
property taxes). The state of California,
for example, has an equalization system that provides state money to
school districts unable to meet a minimum level of funding per student. This
makes school funding and educational
opportunity less dependent on local
wealth and at least somewhat more
equitable. In 1996, California’s school
equity system shared more than $17
billion across the state—about $7.9 billion of which went to school districts
in the Los Angeles region.36
While school equity systems such as California’s help to reduce disparities among school districts, lessen the burden on communities with
low tax revenues, and equalize educational opportunity, they do not
address the fiscal inequities between cities and counties that foster wasteful land-use patterns. To address disparities among local governments,
several states have created strong general revenue–sharing systems where
a portion of the tax revenue collected by the state is redistributed to jurisdictions based on a formula that takes into consideration factors such as
population, tax rates, or local wealth. Among these are Michigan,

Photo courtesy: LACVB, PictureLA.com Photo credit: LACVB/Michele and Tom Grimm

Wisconsin, and Minnesota. A statewide system of general revenue sharing
that takes into account differences in the local costs of living and governmental services could be even more effective.
A few states have created regional equalizing mechanisms that use
local tax resources to create greater regional equity. Unlike statewide
school equity systems or general revenue–sharing systems, these regional
equity systems respond to both intra-regional competition for property
and sales tax base and to the unique cost of living and property valuation
in a particular regional setting. This is done by pooling a percentage of
local property values and/or taxable transactions (the tax base), redistributing the pool to the jurisdictions based on need, and then taxing the new
amount in each jurisdiction at an area-wide rate.
The primary benefit of pooling the tax base rather than tax revenue is
that it produces benefits for multiple levels of government. Since the pool
effectively increases the local tax base of a community, all local governments that generate funds from that tax base benefit—counties, school
districts, cities, and special districts. Thus, the benefit is much more
widely felt than if revenue sharing was conducted only by cities or counties, to the exclusion of other local governments. A regional tax-base sharing system in the Los Angeles region would produce additional tax base
for more than 75 percent of the population of the Los Angeles region and
allow for improved local services and lower taxes (see appendices).
Whatever method is chosen, a regional equity system must be simulated
before discussion begins, so that all parties participating can understand its
impact. In order for such a system to generate sufficient political support,
the proposed reform must make a positive contribution to the tax base of
jurisdictions in which approximately two-thirds of the regional population
lives. A substantial portion—if not a majority—of residents who live outside
the central city (as well as in the central city) should ultimately see increased
local revenues for their community and thus better local services. MARC has
modeled several property and sales tax equity proposals for the Los Angeles
metropolitan region; these are discussed in Appendix A.
SMART GROWTH

“Smart growth” is a concept that is gaining increasing attention across the
country. At its core, smart growth means local planning with a regional
perspective. It implies a land-use plan that encourages regional coopera-

tion rather than competition, less destruction of agricultural land and
open spaces, a balanced transportation system, greater access to affordable housing, more efficient use of public resources, and, ultimately, less
social separation.
As has been shown throughout this report, there are many costs associated with the inequitable, inefficient, sprawling growth seen in so many
regions throughout the country, including Los Angeles. If the patterns that
result in social separation, disinvested central cities, and growing fiscal
stress are allowed to continue, the economic and social stability of the
region will be at risk. Worsening traffic congestion, increased energy consumption and pollution, loss of valuable open space and habitat, and
increasing social separation are just a few
of the negative effects that the Los Angeles
region (as well as many other regions
throughout the country) has already experienced. These unintended consequences
of growth are already degrading the quality
of life for many residents in the region, and
are likely to affect many more people if left
unchecked.
Smart growth is an alternative that
addresses many of these issues and provides a way for regions to weather the economic busts that inevitably occur. It will
also help regions prepare for the unpredictable economic changes that can occur
so quickly in the expanding global economy. A number of scholars have argued that
cities and suburbs within a metropolitan area are economically interdependent, and that economically depressed cities in the core of a region
suppress economic growth throughout the region. Their studies suggest
that when social and economic polarization is minimized and cooperation
maximized, the region as a whole is likely to experience stronger and more
sustained economic growth.37
Although smart growth often means different things to different people, several common themes run through most of the efforts being conducted across the country. These include: 1) growth management mecha-

Smart growth helps
regions prepare for
the unpredictable
economic changes
that can occur so
quickly in the
expanding global
economy.
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Metropolitan planning
organizations like the
Southern California
Association of
Governments must be
made more representative
and accountable to the
regions they serve.

nisms to facilitate orderly and
efficient growth in the region;
2) policies that ensure that
development will make efficient use of infrastructure that
is in place before land is developed; 3) a balanced mix of
housing types and costs
throughout the region that
allows employees to reside
near their jobs, allows families
to stay in their community as
their financial situation
changes, and decreases growing social separation; and 4) a
multi-modal transportation system, providing multiple methods for moving people and goods throughout the region in the most efficient manner.
None of the characteristics are mutually independent, but rather, must be
seen as components of a comprehensive whole.
Oregon is widely seen as the national leader in implementing regional
smart growth planning. Minnesota has adopted a structure to accomplish
much of what is outlined in the Oregon model, but has often failed to
implement its statutes. Washington, Maryland, Florida, Georgia, and
Tennessee, are among the states that have adopted smart growth land-use
plans, although some have been more effective than others and some are
too new to evaluate. An underlying debate on this issue is growing in more
than half of the country’s state legislatures.
METROPOLITAN STRUCTURAL REFORM

Pundits often assert that effective, long-term regional cooperation is
impossible. However, they neglect to note that all urbanized areas with a
population greater than 50,000 already have a multi-jurisdictional regional
government called a Metropolitan Planning Organization (or MPO) in
place. An MPO is a body of local officials, appointed by other state and
local officials, that plans and allocates resources for building and maintaining a regional transportation system.38 Though these MPOs are often little
known by citizens, they make extremely important decisions that affect the
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future of their respective regions. However, while MPOs have the power to
approve billion-dollar highway projects, they cannot coordinate the local
land uses that are necessary for dealing with growing congestion problems.
MPOs need to be empowered to address those issues affecting the
entire region—such as transportation, air and water quality, and environmental protection—that cannot be effectively addressed at the local level.
They must be able to make infrastructure and other public investment
decisions that promote the sustainability of the entire region, the stability
of core communities, the efficiency of the regional transportation system,
and the protection of valuable ecological and agricultural lands.
Throughout the country, the primary task of MPOs has been to develop
a regional transportation plan and distribute federal transportation funds
to projects consistent with this plan. Due to the enormous importance of
federal funding in completing regional-scale transportation projects,
MPOs have a significant influence on the social, economic, and physical
form of the region they represent. They are not, however, held directly
accountable for their decisions because the citizens of the region do not
directly elect them.
Given the significant impact that MPOs can have on shaping regions, it
is essential that they be made more representative and accountable to the
regions they serve. Typically, MPOs make their decisions without meaningful public input concerning the impact of their transportation decisions on the social and economic health of the entire region—particularly
on the older and less affluent areas of the region. Older bedroom communities, inner-city neighborhoods, and organizations committed to these
areas need to recognize their common interests and form a constituency
in the region to address this lack of accountability.
In the Los Angeles region, the MPO is the Southern California
Association of Governments (SCAG), a voluntary organization of regional
cities and counties. SCAG is the largest MPO in the nation, representing
180 cities, 6 counties, 15 million people, and an area roughly the size of
Indiana. While SCAG does wield some regional planning power—especially in distributing federal transportation funds, such as those resulting
from the 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation and Efficiency Act
(ISTEA), and more recently, the 1998 Transportation Equity Act for the
21st Century (TEA-21)—its status as a voluntary organization has limited
its ability to conduct planning and develop scale. Regional governance in
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the Los Angeles region is further complicated by the lack of cooperation
on inter-regional matters in the past.39
Despite these obstacles, a significant effort was made in the late 1980s
to create a strong regional body in the Los Angeles region with the ability
to enforce regional land use, housing, and transportation plans. Efforts
were also made to make SCAG more accountable in this process, by making its council members directly elected. At the regional level, this effort
was fueled largely by the creation of the “L.A. 2000 Committee,” a highly
regarded task force of regional leaders established by
the mayor of Los Angeles that included representatives
from business, churches, and government. This committee produced a report that advocated the creation
of two powerful regional agencies: one that would set
policy for land use, housing, and transportation, and
another that would oversee protection of the regional
environment. At the state level, several bills were introduced that would have supported greater regional governance and regional growth management—most
notably one by then-Assembly Speaker Willie Brown.
While these efforts ultimately failed, SCAG has made
changes to better serve its members, such as expanding its governing board from 35 to 71 local officials and
creating 13 subregional entities for inclusion in the
transportation planning process.
Ultimately, MPOs should evolve into bodies that
much more explicitly weigh the effects of their decisions
on the social health of the older parts of the region and
the fiscal and environmental health of the developing
areas. To do this effectively, MPOs should evolve into
structures with proportional representation that fully takes into account
the different types of regional communities and their varied needs. Over
time, more fairly apportioned regional bodies with the proper geographic scope for regional land-use planning should assume the responsibility for coordinating strategies that can effectively address the growing regional problems mentioned above. MARC believes that, ultimately, MPO members should be directly elected.
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Appendix A

A Closer Look at Tax-Base Sharing

T

ax-base sharing is an important step in regional reform,

because it helps build relationships and coalitions that will
serve to advance other regional reforms. When the financial
implications of land-use planning are gradually de-emphasized,
it becomes much easier to talk about important regional issues such as cooperation in land use, environment protection, and affordable housing. When the Twin Cities region of Minnesota—
an area that is a leader in regional cooperation—recognized that central
cities and suburbs experiencing fiscal stress could be united on shared
fiscal interests, they overcame some of the more intense social barriers
that had long divided the region. Efforts at regional cooperation in the
Los Angeles region would be greatly advanced if Los Angeles and the

MARC has created models
of several possible tax-base
sharing scenarios for the
Los Angeles region,
and most of them produce
the opportunity for lower
taxes and better services
for the majority of the
region’s population.

38

struggling communities surrounding it were to recognize the benefits
that tax-base sharing could provide.
At the outset, the numbers clearly add up to a viable coalition for taxbase sharing in the Los Angeles region. MARC has created models of several possible tax-base sharing scenarios for the region, and most of the
scenarios produce positive results for the majority of the region’s population. A few scenarios would actually provide increased revenues and better services in jurisdictions where as much as 75 percent of the regional
population lives. While there are countless formulas that could be used in
a tax-base sharing system, one of the most promising examples is presented here.
It is important to note that a property or sales tax-base sharing system
requires all communities to tax the affected categories of property or
transactions at an area-wide tax rate. In California, under current laws,
these rates would have to be within the provisions of Proposition 13 and
the Bradley-Burns situs rule. In other words, the rate could not exceed
1 percent plus any rate necessary to pay off voter-approved indebtedness.
Further, since this type of resource sharing relates only to the sharing of
tax base and not revenue, neither Proposition 4 (which requires that revenues in excess of the budget limit be returned to taxpayers) nor
Proposition 218 (which requires that a specific amount of tax revenues go
to schools) would be affected. A jurisdiction’s total revenue (which would
include revenue generated from the new tax base) could still be used as
these propositions require.

Tax-Base Sharing
Tax Base Change per Capita

Sales Tax-Base Sharing Scenario

% of Regional Population
Gaining Tax-Base

76.6 %

In this scenario, each of the cities and the
unincorporated areas of each county in the region
are required to contribute to the tax-base pool
40 percent of the growth in their taxable sales
transactions from 1986 to 1996. This tax-base pool
is then redistributed back to the communities based
on a formula giving preference to those communities with relatively low taxable transactions per capita.

This particular model run produced new tax
base for 77 percent of the total population of
the Los Angeles region. More than $3.8 billion
in taxable transactions were shared in this scenario. Most cities benefiting were found south
and east of Los Angeles, although many cities
throughout the region were net recipients—
including cities with very high property tax

base, but little sales tax base. Less affluent cities
that particularly benefit from this scenario are
Bell Gardens ($662 per capita), Compton
($442), and Inglewood ($374). In addition, all
unincorporated areas would receive disbursements from the regional pool under this formula. Detailed information on this sales tax-base
sharing run is given in Appendix B.
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Appendix B

Hypothetical Sales Tax-Base Sharing

Table 1: Redistribution of 40 percent of Growth in Taxable Transactions 1986-1996 According to Total Taxable Transactions per Capita for Municipalities and County Unincorporated Areas.

Municipality/County
Unincorporated Area

Estimated
Population
1996

Per Capita
Distribution

Municipality/County
Unincorporated Area

Adelanto

($11,855,684)

13,334

($889)

Compton

Agoura Hills

($18,140,093)

21,185

($856)

Corona

Alhambra

($15,361,917)

88,561

($173)

Anaheim

$46,176,144

293,994

$157

Apple Valley

Net
Distribution

Estimated
Population
1996

Per Capita
Distribution

$41,221,819

93,314

$442

($192,889,731)

99,487

($1,939)

Costa Mesa

$7,992,637

102,344

$78

Covina

$7,462,991

45,954

$162

Cudahy

$11,544,354

24,412

$473

$3,003,260

40,539

$74

($156,269,659)

46,517

($3,359)

—

52,756

—

Arcadia

$9,227,186

52,088

$177

Culver City

Artesia

$3,630,534

16,392

$221

Cypress

Avalon

($328,136)

3,404

($96)

Dana Point

Azusa

$13,347,368

43,991

$303

Desert Hot Springs

Baldwin Park

$21,068,002

73,538

$286

Diamond Bar

—

56,021

—

Banning

($1,326,785)

23,861

($56)

Downey

$20,726,924

97,621

$212

Barstow

($50,731,324)

22,264

($2,279)

Duarte

($59,701,710)

21,911

($2,725)

$3,109,920

10,437

$298

El Monte

$25,284,929

113,357

$223

Bell

$17,684,957

36,422

$486

El Segundo

($2,024,920)

16,068

($126)

Bell Gardens

$28,970,514

43,757

$662

Fillmore

$6,444,128

12,753

$505

Bellflower

$20,482,423

65,296

$314

Fontana

($96,586,144)

103,108

($937)

Beverly Hills

($23,063,526)

33,292

($693)

($127,999,365)

54,451

($2,351)

Big Bear Lake

($9,943,485)

5,949

($1,671)

Fullerton

$22,602,940

122,370

$185

Bradbury

$9,878,330

890

$11,099

Garden Grove

$36,659,728

151,764

$242

($143,658,999)

34,892

($4,117)

Gardena

$11,166,424

56,836

$196
$195

Beaumont

Brea

Fountain Valley

—

36,077

—

$6,957,461

14,827

$469

Buena Park

$11,144,920

72,888

$153

Glendale

$37,758,157

193,546

Burbank

($25,332,800)

101,474

($250)

Glendora

$14,670,299

51,257

$286

—

18,835

—

Grand Terrace

$13,257,911

13,181

$1,006

Hawaiian Gardens

$405

Calabasas
Calimesa

—

7,304

—

Camarillo

($54,115,251)

58,027

($933)

—

11,279

—

Canyon Lake
Carson

$11,013,530

88,186

$125

Cathedral City

($30,893,011)

35,470

($871)

$3,176,583

55,356

$57
($1,957)

Cerritos
Chino

$5,877,053

14,515

Hawthorne

$18,639,738

76,751

$243

Hemet

($19,202,200)

52,558

($365)

18,691

$230

Hermosa Beach
Hesperia
Hidden Hills
Highland

—
$2,351,176

—

1,865

$1,261

40,418

—
$213

Huntington Park

$20,598,330

60,200

$342

Indian Wells

($13,306,845)

3,077

($4,325)

$10,582,374

42,087

$251

($165,659,624)

687

($241,135)

49,689

—

Huntington Beach

Claremont

$11,012,670

34,042

$324

Coachella

$849,705

21,036

$40

$8,681,413

44,443

$195

$298,262

12,722

$23

Indio
Industry

—

59,287

187,664

63,295

—

Commerce

$4,298,451

$40,017,805

($123,842,797)

Chino Hills

Colton

40

Net
Distribution

Municipality/County
Unincorporated Area

Inglewood
Irvine

Net
Distribution

Estimated
Population
1996

Per Capita
Distribution

$43,454,158

116,089

$374

($357,781,584)

127,540

($2,805)

Municipality/County
Unincorporated Area

Newport Beach

Net
Distribution

Estimated
Population
1996

Per Capita
Distribution

$7,265,154

69,246

$105

Norco

($56,230,261)

24,498

($2,295)

$10,107

1,091

$9

Norwalk

$35,270,779

99,836

$353

$5,641,381

20,028

$282

Ojai

($3,027,611)

8,040

($377)

La Habra

$13,014,270

54,257

$240

Ontario

($301,225,680)

142,229

($2,118)

La Habra Heights

$15,152,244

6,545

$2,315

Orange

$15,289,617

120,043

$127

La Mirada

($42,616,632)

45,798

($931)

Oxnard

($24,998,891)

152,778

($164)

La Palma

($24,390,730)

15,544

($1,569)

Palm Desert

($157,874,428)

33,471

($4,717)

La Puente

$18,349,003

40,405

$454

Palm Springs

La Quinta

($31,795,963)

18,045

($1,762)

Irwindale
La Canada Flintridge

$7,322,140

41,698

$176

($158,825,931)

112,035

($1,418)

Palos Verdes Estates

$20,868,421

13,976

$1,493

Paramount

$13,838,737

53,933

$257

Palmdale

La Verne

($2,756,747)

32,320

($85)

Laguna Beach

($6,949,137)

23,851

($291)

Laguna Hills

—

25,084

—

Pasadena

$16,309,726

137,202

$119

Laguna Niguel

—

55,705

—

Perris

($49,727,603)

30,478

($1,632)

Lake Elsinore

($50,791,703)

25,616

($1,983)

Pico Rivera

—

57,779

—

Lake Forest

$19,953,422

61,143

$326

Placentia

$9,545,291

45,119

$212
$307

Lakewood

$18,078,911

77,187

$234

Pomona

$42,873,117

139,860

Lancaster

$30,503,970

121,079

$252

Port Hueneme

$17,203,910

22,183

$776

Lawndale

$9,669,095

29,486

$328

Rancho Cucamonga

($154,201,584)

115,768

($1,332)

($21,950,625)

21,172

($1,037)

Rancho Mirage

($29,992,478)

10,557

($2,841)

$8,090,696

20,101

$403

Rancho Palos Verdes

$49,904,522

42,691

$1,169

$155,193,666

437,991

$354

Redlands

$8,126,698

65,555

$124

Los Alamitos

$1,516,683

12,338

$123

Redondo Beach

$11,276,525

63,945

$176

Los Angeles

$955,272,802

3,639,908

$262

Rialto

($20,173,278)

80,192

($252)

$54,577,144

65,966

$827

Riverside

$47,833,034

243,401

$197

—

12,184

—

Rolling Hills

$22,327,903

1,979

$11,282

Manhattan Beach

($25,876,472)

33,920

($763)

$119

Maywood

$20,292,542

29,170

$696

90,138

—

Loma Linda
Lomita
Long Beach

Lynwood
Malibu

Mission Viejo

—

Monrovia

($6,968,874)

38,929

($179)

Montclair

$2,074,069

29,923

$69

Montebello

($26,261,561)

62,166

($422)

Monterey Park

$24,700,878

63,988

$386

Moorpark
Moreno Valley
Murrieta

Rolling Hills Estates

$972,845

8,193

Rosemead

$24,223,703

54,513

$444

San Bernardino

$33,169,831

181,437

$183

San Buenaventura

$14,399,133

99,992

$144

San Clemente

($12,143,023)

46,728

($260)

San Dimas

($27,331,456)

35,099

($779)

San Fernando

($51,164,903)

23,590

($2,169)

($18,193,019)

27,662

($658)

San Gabriel

$11,717,789

39,613

$296

($101,883,332)

133,420

($764)

San Jacinto

$14,947,677

23,915

$625

—

34,569

—

San Juan Capistrano

($55,407,532)

29,023

($1,909)
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Net
Distribution

Estimated
Population
1996

$9,956,390

13,409

Santa Ana

$58,654,963

306,571

$191

Santa Clarita

($35,555,454)

129,924

($2,264)

—

15,704

—

90,306

$37

Municipality/County
Unincorporated Area

San Marino

Santa Fe Springs
Santa Monica

$743

Santa Paula

$6,185,604

26,597

$233

Seal Beach

$7,754,284

26,434

$293

Sierra Madre

$15,589,599

11,176

$1,395

Signal Hill

($92,551,715)

8,780

($10,541)

Simi Valley

($51,305,631)

102,855

($499)

South El Monte

$3,214,860

21,766

$148

South Gate

$37,174,106

91,102

$408

South Pasadena

$10,000,473

24,881

$402

$8,299,070

31,964

$260

Stanton
Temecula

—

41,850

—

Temple City

$14,992,861

33,055

$454

Thousand Oaks

($85,480,878)

111,676

($765)

$13,282,641

139,889

$95

($222,104,267)

63,780

($3,482)

Torrance
Tustin
Twentynine Palms

—

14,756

—

$626,649,579

978,238

$641

$77,806,283

181,278

$429

Unincorporated Riverside

$215,815,392

380,512

$567

Unincorporated San Bernardino

Unincorporated Los Angeles
Unincorporated Orange

$179,916,478

280,611

$641

Unincorporated Ventura

$57,189,030

91,204

$627

Upland

$15,069,415

66,133

$228

Vernon

$0

81

$0

($105,115,097)

59,920

($1,754)

Victorville
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$3,298,941

Per Capita
Distribution

Percentage of regional population
gaining sales tax-base:
%

76.6

Note: Municipalities without data did not exist in 1986.
Data Sources: California State Board of Equalization, Taxable Sales in California (Sales & Use Tax) During
1986 Twenty-Sixth Annual Report, and Taxable Sales in California (Sales & Use Tax) During 1996 Thirty-Sixth
Annual Report, Tables 2, 5 and 6 (1986 and 1996 taxable transactions data); California Department of Finance,
Demographic Research Unit (1996 population estimates).
Methodology:

Each municipality is required to contribute 40 percent of its 1986-1996 growth in taxable transactions *
into a tax-base pool. (For the purposes of these tax-base sharing run calculations, the unincorporated areas
within each county were treated as if they were municipalities; therefore, the terms “municipality” and
“municipal” should be taken to refer to both the actual incorporated municipalities and the surrounding
county unincorporated areas.) Then, a “distribution index” is calculated to determine what percentage
share each municipality will get back out of the pool. This distribution index is equal to the municipality’s
population multiplied by the ratio of the metropolitan region’s taxable transactions per capita to the
municipality’s taxable transactions per capita. Each municipality’s distribution index is then divided by
the sum of all the distribution indexes to arrive at each municipality’s percentage share of the tax-base pool.
This percentage is then multiplied by the tax-base pool amount to determine the actual amount the municipality receives back. Finally, the amount the municipality contributes is subtracted from the amount the
municipality receives to arrive at the net distribution to the municipality.

Step 1: 1986-1996 municipal growth in taxable transactions* X 0.40 = Municipal Contribution
Step 2: Municipal population X [(region’s taxable transactions ÷ region’s population)

÷ (municipal taxable transactions ÷ municipal population)] = Distribution Index
Step 3: Distribution Index ÷ sum of Distribution Indexes = Municipal Share of tax base to be distributed
Step 4: Municipal Share X sum of Municipal Contributions = Municipal Distribution
Step 5: Municipal Distribution

– Municipal Contribution = Municipal Net Distribution

Villa Park

$5,704,603

6,382

$894

Walnut

($6,047,987)

31,614

($191)

* 1986 dollars were adjusted upwards by a factor of 1.4471 to convert

West Covina

$23,862,004

101,956

$234

1986 CPI =109.6; 1996 CPI=158.6 (Base: 1982-1984 CPI=100)

West Hollywood

$4,641,011

37,195

$125

Westlake Village

($14,871,625)

7,836

($1,898)

Westminster

$13,961,310

82,749

$169

Whittier

$21,351,187

82,550

$259

Yorba Linda

($63,665,326)

57,782

($1,102)

Yucaipa

—

37,394

—

Yucca Valley

—

18,604

—

to 1996 dollars.
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